Transcriber's Note:
Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has been preserved.
Some footnotes have two anchors in the text,the second of these has 'a' appended to distinguish it from the first, i.e. [1] and [1a].
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.For a complete list, please see the end of this document.
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SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONS
TO THE WAR OF
1812
BY
CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
United States Navy
AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783," "THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
AND EMPIRE," "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA
IN SEA POWER," ETC.
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY
Limited
PREFACE
The present work concludes the series of "The Influence of Sea Powerupon History," as originally framed in the conception of the author.In the previous volumes he has had the inspiring consciousness ofregarding his subject as a positive and commanding element in thehistory of the world. In the War of 1812, also, the effect is real anddread enough; but to his own country, to the United States, as amatter of national experience, the lesson is rather that of theinfluence of a negative quantity upon national history. The phrasescarcely lends itself to use as a title; but it represents the truthwhich the author has endeavored to set forth, though recognizingclearly that the victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain doillustrate, in a distinguished manner, his principal thesis, thecontrolling influence upon events of naval power, even whentransferred to an inland body of fresh water. The lesson there,however, was the same as in the larger fields of war heretoforetreated. Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided,but by force massed, and handled in skilful combination. It mattersnot that the particular force be small. The art of war is the samethroughout; and may be illustrated as really, though lessconspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard,or the three units of the Horatii, as by a host of a hundredthousand.
[vi]The interest of the War of 1812, to Americans, has commonly been feltto lie in the brilliant evidence of high professional tone andefficiency reached by their navy, as shown by the single-ship actions,and by the two decisive victories achieved by little squadrons uponthe lakes. Without in the least overlooking the permanent value ofsuch examples and such traditions, to the nation, and to the militaryservice which they illustrate, it nevertheless appears to the writerthat the effect may be even harmful to the people at